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VI. COPYRIGHT, PATENT & TRADEMARK LAW
Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co.:
Interpreting the "Work Made for Hire" Doctrine of the 1976
Copyright Act
The Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act) established that, for an individual
to own a copyright on a work, the individual must be the author of the
work.' In determining who has authored a particular work, the original
statute governing copyright, the Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act), provided
that an employer was the author of his employee's work if the work was
a "work made for hire." 2 Although the 1909 Act did not define "work
made for hire," Congress, in drafting the 1976 Act, defined a "work made
for hire" in section 101 of the 1976 Act as a project that an employee
prepares in the scope of the employee's employmeht.1 Additionally, the 1976
Act includes as a "work made for hire" a specially ordered or commissioned
work that satisfies one of nine specific categories. 4 Commentators disagree
sharply over whether the phrasing of the work made for hire section of the
1976 Act alters pre-1976 law and, if so, over the degree to which the work
made for hire section alters the law.5 Particularly, commentators have
1. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982). Section 201(a) of Title 17 of the United States Code
provides in part that ownership of a copyright in a work originates in the author or authors
of the work. Id. Paragraph (b) of section 201 establishes that, if a work is made for hire, the
employer or person that hires someone to produce the work is the author of the work for
copyright purposes. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982). Unless the employer and the hired party sign
a written agreement to the contrary, the employer owns all of the rights inherent in the
copyright. Id.
The 1909 Copyright Act gave statutory recognition for the first time to employers as
potential authors of their employees' work. Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 26, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909),
amended by 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982). The 1909 Act did not offer a definition of "work
made for hire" or "employer." Id. Before 1976 the common law determined copyright
ownership in work made for hire cases. A. LATmA, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 114, 117 (6th ed.
1986). The 1976 Act, however, provides a definition of work made for hire. See infra notes
3-4 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of § 101 of 1976 Act). See generally A.
LATN, supra, at 117 (discussing legislative history of §§ 24 and 26 of 1909 Act).
2. 26 Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 26, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909), amended by 17 U.S.C. § 201(b)
(1976).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (1982).
4. Id. § 101(2). A specially ordered or commissioned work satisfying section 101 of
the 1976 Act may be a contribution to a collective work, part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, a translation, a supplementary work, a compilation, an instructional text, a
test, answer material for a test, or an atlas. Id.
5. See, e.g., A. LATmAN, supra note 1, at 118 (§ 101 of 1976 Act replaced common-
law presumptions about ownership of copyright under work made for hire doctrine); 1 M.
NmmaR, COPYRIGHT § 5.03[B][2][c], at 5-22 (1985) (commissioning party had broader rights
under 1909 Act than under 1976 Act); O'Meara, "Works Made for Hire" Under the Copyright
Act of 1976-Two Interpretations, 15 CREIGHTON L. REv. 523, 525 (1982) (law remains same
under 1976 Act as under 1909 Act). See generally Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815
F.2d 323, 329-31 (5th Cir. 1987) (courts addressing work for hire doctrine have developed two
distinct interpretations and third "compromise" interpretation of § 101 of 1976 Act); O'Meara,
supra, at 528 (discussing differences between "radical" and "conservative" interpretations of
1976 Act's work made for hire doctrine).
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debated whether section 101 of the 1976 Act includes in its definition of
"works made for hire" works that independent contractors produce.6 Al-
though, under the 1909 Act, a majority of courts presumed that copyright
vested in a commissioning or hiring person unless courts could ascertain a
contrary intention between the parties, 7 the 1976 Act expressly does not
delineate whether a work that an independent contractor produces is a
"work made for hire.' Although a few courts have determined that section
101 of the 1976 Act preserves the broad common-law definition of work
made for hire, 9 other courts have determined that section 101 excludes
independent contractors from the category of "employees" and, therefore,
6. See Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 328 (language of § 101 of 1976 Act is unclear as
to status of independent contractors). In questioning whether works that independent contrac-
tors produce are "works made for hire" under section 101 of the 1976 Act, courts have had
to determine whether independent contractors are "employees" under the 1976 Act. Id. Courts,
however, have disagreed as to the method by which to define the word "employee." Id. Some
courts, like the majority of courts before 1976, include independent contractors in their
definitions of "employee." See Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D. Colo.
1985) (adopting pre-1976 common-law presumption that, whether employee or independent
contractor prepares work, parties' intentions determine work for hire status); Clarkstown v.
Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 141-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (even if worker is independent contractor,
employer's intent to retain right to supervise and control worker's projects indicates employment
relationship). Other courts, however, have held that the amount of control that a hiring party
exercises defines whether a person is an "employee." See Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Sys.
Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th Cir.) (word "employee" does not include only "regular"
employees because right to control determines employment status), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
434 (1986); Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir. 1984)
("employer" may so control and supervise "independent" contractor that independent con-
tractor becomes employee under § 101(1) of 1976 Act), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
Finally, some courts have determined that the word "employee" only represents a relationship
of "formal" employment and have excluded independent contractors from the coverage of
section 101. See Easter Seal Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 334-36 (hiring party's right to control cannot
make independent contractor into employee); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller v. Empire
Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 257 (D. Neb. 1982) (although proper test to determine whether
employment relationship exists is hiring party's right to control worker, formal independent
contractors are not employees).
7. See 1 M. NraMER, supra note 5, § 5.03[B][2][c], at 5-21 (under 1909 Act, if courts
could not ascertain intentions of parties, copyright vested originally in independent contractor);
O'Meara, supra note 5, at 524 (under 1909 Act, intention of parties determined copyright
ownership); see also Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565,
568 (2d Cir. 1966) (in absence of express contractual provision, presumption is that copyright
in independent contractor's work vests in commissioning party); Frontino v. Avon Prods.,
Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 713, 713-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (if court cannot ascertain intention of parties,
presumption is that person who commissions work owns copyright on work); Hartfield v.
Herzfeld, 60 F.2d 599, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1932) (mutual intention of parties determines whether
commissioning party has right to make copies of independent contractor's work).
8. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
9. See Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D. Colo. 1985) (adopting
pre-1976 case law presumption that, whether employee or independent contractor prepares
work, parties' intentions determine work for hire status); Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp.
137, 141-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (despite appearances of independent contractor relationship, hiring
party's intent to retain right to supervise and control work indicates that employment rela-
tionship exists).
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that independent contractors own the copyrights on the works that they
produce.10 Additionally, some courts have taken a "compromise" position
by holding that a hiring party owns the copyright on an independent
contractor's work under the 1976 Act if the hiring party, as a temporary
employer, controls the activities of an independent contractor." In Brun-
swick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co.' 2 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether members of a
newspaper's design staff could become temporary employees of an advertiser
for copyright purposes. 3
In Brunswick the plaintiff, Brunswick Beacon, Inc. (Beacon), and the
defendant, the Schock-Hopchas Publishing Company (Free Press), published
competing weekly newspapers in a small town in North Carolina.' 4 The
Beacon employed an advertisement design staff that would develop original
advertising layouts for advertisers that did not submit their own layouts.
5
The Free Press, however, did not employ a design staff.16 Instead, the Free
10. See, e.g., Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F,2d 323, 334-36 (5th Cir. 1987)
(right to control cannot make independent contractor into employee, so categories of § 101
are mutually exclusive); Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. 1307,
1319 (D. Pa. 1985) (work for hire doctrine applies to independent contractors only in instances
enumerated in § 101(2)), aff'd on other grounds, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 877 (1987); Childers v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 978, 984 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (if independent contractor's project does not fall into one of enumerated categories of
§ 101(2), project is not work made for hire); Mister B Textiles v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc.,
523 F. Supp. 21, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 854 (D.N.J.
1981) (same).
11. See Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th Cir. 1986)
(word "employee" does not include only "regular" employees because right to control
determines employment status), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 434 (1986); Aldon Accessories Ltd. v.
Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir. 1984) (hiring party may so control and supervise
independent contractor that independent contractor becomes employee under § 101(1) of 1976
Act), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); cf. Joseph J. Legat Architects v. United States, 625
F. Supp. 293, 298 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (although definition of employment rests on hiring party's
right to control work of employee, formal independent contractors by definition are not
employees); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 258
(D. Neb. 1982) (same).
12. 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1987).
13. Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410, 413 (4th
Cir. 1987). In Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co. the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether the Beacon, as the formal employer
of the advertisement artists, owned the copyright to the advertisements, or whether the
advertisers, after temporarily employing the artists, became authors of the artists' work and
owners of the copyright on the advertisements. Id. at 411-13.
14. Id. at 411. In Brunswick the newspapers competed in the eastern North Carolina
town of Shallotte. Id.
15. Id. at 412. In Brunswick the advertisers' requirements guided the Beacon's adver-
tisement design staff in its work. Id. The Beacon, after designing a layout for an advertiser,
claimed the copyright to the advertisement by printing notice of its claim on the advertisement
and by copyrighting the newspaper's contents. Id. In Brunswick the Beacon, following its
usual procedure, claimed the copyright on the advertisements that the Free Press printed. Id.
16. Id. at 411-12.
1988]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:735
Press, at the request of advertisers, published advertisements that the Beacon
staff had designed. 7 As a result, the Free Press was able to charge less for
advertising space than the Beacon. 8 After the Beacon notified the Free
Press that the Free Press' use of the Beacon's advertisements violated the
Beacon's copyright on the advertisements, the Beacon and the Free Press
agreed that the Free Press would stop printing the Beacon's advertisements.' 9
Despite the agreement, however, the Free Press continued to publish the
advertisements that the Beacon's staff had designed. 20
The Beacon brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina, alleging that the Free Press, in violation
of the 1976 Act, had infringed the Beacon's copyright in the advertisements
that the Beacon staff had designed. 2' The Free Press argued that, under the
work made for hire doctrine of the 1976 Act, the Beacon did not own the
copyright on the advertisements.22 The Free Press claimed that the adver-
tisers, independently contracting with the Beacon's design staff, owned the
copyright on the advertisements and had the right to submit the advertise-
ments for publication in the Free Press.Y The district court, however, found
that, under the 1976 Act, the Beacon, as designer of the advertisements,
had a valid claim to the copyright on the advertisements.2 The Free Press
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.2-
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit considered whether the Beacon staff had
designed the advertisements as employees of the Beacon or whether the
advertisers had employed the staff of the Beacon to produce the advertise-
ments.26 The Brunswick court recognized that section 101(1) and section
101(2) of the 1976 Act suggest two exclusive categories of works made for
17. Id. at 411. In Brunswick the Free Press deleted the Beacon's copyright claim on all
of the Beacon advertisements that the Free Press printed, published two of the advertisements
with no changes and one of the advertisements with only slight changes. Id. at 412.
18. Id. at 411.
19. Id. In Brunswick the Free Press, in response to the Beacon's protests, promised to
tell the advertisers that the Beacon had claimed the copyright to the advertisements and
promised not to print any more advertisements on which the Beacon might own the copyright.
Id.
20. Id.
21. See id. (discussing district court's decision in Brunswick).
22. See id. (discussing district court's consideration of whether, under work for hire
doctrine, Beacon or advertisers owned copyright on advertisements).
23. See id. (discussing district court's reasoning that, if advertisers were authors, adver-
tisers would own copyright and have right to submit advertisements for publication in
defendant's newspaper).
24. See id. (discussing district court's holding in Brunswick). The district court in
Brunswick awarded the Beacon the statutory penalty for copyright infringement. Id. Addition-
ally, the district court awarded the Beacon attorneys' fees after finding that the Free Press
willfully had infringed the Beacon's copyright on the advertisements. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 414.
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hire. 27 The Brunswick court determined that the two categories of section
101 require that, for an employer to own the copyright on a project, an
employee either must prepare the project within the scope of his employ-
ment, or the hiring party specially must order or commission the project
for one of nine enumerated purposes. 28 The Brunswick court first considered
whether the advertisements satisfied one of section 101(2)'s nine definitions
of a specially ordered or commissioned work.29 The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that, even if the advertisements satisfied one of the nine enumerated
categories of section 101(2), the advertisements were not specially ordered
or commissioned works because the Beacon and the advertisers did not sign
a written agreement, as required by section 101(2) of the 1976 Act, estab-
lishing that both the advertisers and the Beacon understood that the adver-
tisements were works made for hire.30 As a result, the Brunswick court
determined that, for the Free Press' defense to succeed, the Free Press
needed to show that an employment relationship satisfying section 101(1)
existed between the advertisers and the Beacon design staff.
3'
In determining whether an employment relationship existed between the
advertisers and the design staff, the Fourth Circuit rejected the pre-1976
definition of employment which presumed that, if a court could not ascertain
whether the parties intended that the "employer" would own the copyright
on the work, then copyright vested in the employer.32 The Fourth Circuit
acknowledged, however, that an individual, although employed by one party,
might act as the temporary employee of another party and produce works
made for hire within the scope of his temporary employment.33 The Brun-
swick court suggested that, if the advertisers sufficiently supervised and
directed the Beacon advertisement design staff's work, the relationship
between the Beacon staff as an independent contractor and the advertiser
as a commissioning party could have become a relationship between em-
ployee and employer.3 4 The Brunswick court recognized that, if the adver-
27. Id. at 412-13; see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (describing content of §
101 of 1976 Act).
28. Brunswick, 810 F.2d at 412-13.
29. See id. at 413 (suggesting that newspaper might be collective work or compilation,
which are two of enumerated categories in § 101(2)).
30. Id. at 414. In addition to requiring that a work satisfy one of nine specific categories,
Section 101(2) of the 1976 Act requires that the hiring party and the worker sign a written
agreement expressing the parties' acknowledgement that the work is "made for hire." 17
U.S.C. § 101(2) (1982).
31. Brunswick, 810 F.2d at 414; see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (under §
101(l) of 1976 Act, work made for hire is either work that employee produces within scope
of employment or work that hiring party specially orders or commissions).
32. Brunswick, 810 F.2d at 414; see supra note 7 and accompanying text (under 1909
Act, if courts could not ascertain intentions of parties, courts presumed that copyright vested
in commissioning party).
33. Brunswick, 810 F.2d at 413.
34. Id. In Brunswick the Fourth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc. Id.; see
1988]
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tisers had become temporary employers of the Beacon design staff, the
advertisers, under the 1976 Act, would have owned the copyright on the
advertisements. 5 The Fourth Circuit, however, determined that the rela-
tionship between the Beacon's design staff and the advertisers lacked suf-
ficient supervision and direction by the advertisers to make the relationship
into a relationship between an employer and employee.36 The Fourth Circuit,
therefore, affirmed the district court's decision that, because the advertisers
had neither employed nor specially commissioned the Beacon design staff
to design the advertisements, the Beacon owned the copyright on the
advertisements that the Free Press published.
37
In contrast to the majority's opinion, Judge Hall, in a dissent to the
Brunswick decision, reasoned that Congress, by enacting the 1976 Act, did
Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984) ("employer" may so
control and supervise "independent" contractor that independent contractor becomes employee
under § 101(1) of 1976 Act), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); infra notes 52-55 and
accompanying text (discussing reasoning and holding of Aldon court).
35. See Brunswick, 810 F.2d at 413 (comparing situation in Brunswick to situation in
Aldon, in which plaintiff conceived artistic idea, worked closely every day with artists, and
approved and disapproved results of artists' work); see also Aldon, 738 F.2d 548 at 552
(plaintiff, who commissioned artists to design statuettes, was temporary employer of artists
who produced statuettes within scope of employment); infra notes 48-55 and accompanying
text (discussing facts and holding in Aldon).
36. See Brunswick, 810 F.2d at 413 (advertisers ordered particular advertisements from
Beacon staff but did not supervise or direct Beacon staff in development of advertisements).
After the Brunswick court determined that the advertisers had not employed the Beacon design
artists, the Brunswick court addressed the potential difficulties that the Brunswick court's
decision could create. Id. at 413-14. First, the Fourth Circuit determined that, by vesting
copyright in newspapers that design advertisements, courts pose little danger that advertisers
constantly will infringe newspaper copyrights. Id.; see Canfield v. The Ponchatoula Times,
No. 83-3000, slip op. at 13 (E.D. La. June 6, 1984) (vesting ownership of copyright in
newspaper results in constant copyright infringement by advertiser). The Brunswick court
reasoned that, as long as advertisers obtain the consent of a designing newspaper before
publishing advertisements in other newspapers, the designing newspaper cannot charge the
advertiser with copyright infringement. Brunswick, 810 F.2d at 414. Second, the Brunswick
court recognized that pre-1976 decisions evidenced concern about advertisers' relative lack of
expertise in copyright law. Id.; see Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp.,
369 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1966) (because small business advertisers know little about subtleties
of copyright law, vesting copyright in advertisers regardless of lack of advertiser control over
design of newspaper advertisement will protect advertisers from unfair surprise). The Brunswick
court reasoned that newspapers, by publishing copyright notices on their advertisements,
significantly eliminate the possibility that advertisers will use the advertisements in violation
of copyright law. Brunswick, 810 F.2d at 414. Finally, the Fourth Circuit determined that an
advertiser holding a copyright on his advertisements would gain nothing by being able to
prevent the use of his advertisements in other publications. Id. The Brunswick court, however,
determined that a newspaper publisher holding a copyright on advertisements legitimately
would wish to prevent other newspapers from publishing the same advertisements and unfairly
competing with the newspaper publisher. Id. The Brunswick court, therefore, reasoned that
ownership of the copyright on advertisements benefits the publisher of the newspaper but not
the advertiser. Id.
37. Brunswick, 810 F.2d at 414.
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not intend to alter the status of the work made for hire doctrine." Judge
Hall determined that, because the 1976 Act did not alter existing law, the
employment relationship that the 1976 Act refers to in section 101(1) is
broad.3 9 Judge Hall reasoned that the section 101(1) employment relationship
may include nontraditional employment relationships, like the relationships
between the advertisers and the Beacon's design staff, if employers simply
retain the right to supervise and direct production40 Judge Hall, in his
dissent, determined that the advertisers initiated and financed the develop-
ment of the advertisements and retained the right to control and supervise
the tenor and the content of the advertisements. 4' Judge Hall, therefore,
concluded that the advertisers owned the copyright on the advertisements
and that the Fourth Circuit should have decided in favor of the publishers
of the Free Press.4
-
In determining that Congress, in dividing section 101 of the 1976 Act
into two paragraphs, intended to distinguish between works that employees
produce within the scope of their employment and works that a commis-
sioning party specially orders or commissions, the Brunswick court is
consistent with the majority of courts that have interpreted section 101.43
38. Brunswick, 810 F.2d at 414 (Hall, J., dissenting). In the dissent in Brunswick, Judge
Hall reasoned that, from the language and history of section 101 of the 1976 Act, Congress,
in enacting the 1976 Act, did not intend to alter pre-1976 case law. Id. Judge Hall determined
that, under the most logical reading of section 101, a commissioned worker can be an employee
if the worker performs his work at the insistence and expense of the commissioning party. Id,
at 415; see supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing decisions that preserve broad
common-law definition of work made for hire). Additionally, Judge Hall, in his dissent,
recognized that the language of section 201(b) of the 1976 Act describes the copyright owner
of a work made for hire as either the employer or "other person for whom the work was
prepared," which, according to the Brunswick dissent, implies that section 101(1) of the 1976
Act does not adopt the traditional definition of "employment." Id.
39. Brunswick, 810 F.2d at 414 (Hall, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 414-15.
41. Id. at 415.
42. Id. at 415. In his dissent in Brunswick, Judge Hall argued that the majority's decision
in Brunswick threatens newspapers with the possibility of constant copyright infringement, Id.
Judge Hall recognized Congress' rejection of the "shop right doctrine," a doctrine that would
have allowed employees to retain the copyrights of their works as long as the employees did
not allow the competition to utilize the works. Id. Judge Hall determined that congressional
rejection of the shop right doctrine in copyright law illustrates Congress' reluctance to allow
employees to retain copyright on works that they produce at work. Id.
43. See, e.g., Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 334-36 (5th Cir. 1987)
(Congress intended that categories of § 101 would be mutually exclusive); Evans Newton Inc.
v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th Cir.) (although Congress intended that §
101 categories would be mutually exclusive, Congress also intended that "employer's" right
to control development of work would determine employment status), cert, denied, 107 S. Ct.
434 (1986); Sandwiches Inc. v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 1066, 1072 (E.D. Wis. 1987)
(two categories of works made for hire under § 101 are mutually exclusive); Joseph J. Legat
Architects v. United States, 625 F. Supp. 293, 297 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (only works that Congress
specifically named in § 101(2) are specially ordered or commissioned works for hire); Whelan
Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1319 (D. Pa. 1985) (Congress
intended that work for hire doctrine would apply to independent contractors only in instances
19881
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The legislative history of the 1976 Act and the opinions of several com-
mentators indicate that Congress, in enacting the 1976 Act, intended to
alter the pre-1976 law concerning works made for hire. 4 Commentators
have disagreed, however, over whether an independent contractor may
qualify as an employee under section 101 of the 1976 Act.45 Some courts
have reasoned that, regardless of the amount of control that a commissioning
party exercises over an independent contractor, an independent contractor
by definition is not an employee.
46
Like the Fourth Circuit in Brunswick, however, some courts have
concluded that, if a commissioning party exercises a significant amount of
control over an independent contractor, the independent contractor becomes
a temporary employee of the commissioning party and the independent
contractor's works become works made for hire under section 101(1) of the
1976 Act. 47 For example, in Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc.48 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered whether
independent artists that contract with a company to design statuettes are
employees of the company under the 1976 Act.49 In Aldon, Aldon Acces-
enumerated by § 101(2)), aff'd on other grounds, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 877 (1987); Canfield v. The Ponchatoula Times, No. 83-3000, slip op. at 9 n.9
(E.D. La. June 6, 1984) (Congress intended that enumerated categories of § 101(2) would
represent the only types of commissioned works that will be "works made for hire"); Childers
v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 978, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Congress intended
that, if independent contractor's work does not fall into one of enumerated categories of §
101(2), work is not work made for hire); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller v. Empire Constr.
Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 258 (D. Neb. 1982) (Congress intended that § 101(2) exclusively would
govern work of formal independent contractors); Mister B Textiles v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc.,
523 F. Supp. 21, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Congress intended that, if independent contractor's
work did not satisfy one of nine categories of § 101(2), independent contractor's Work would
not be work made for hire); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 854 (D.N.J. 1981) (Congress
intended that categories of § 101 would be mutually exclusive).
44. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADbuN. NEWS 5659, 5737 (§ 101(2) of 1976 Act enumerates specific categories
of commissioned works that will qualify as works made for hire in particular circumstances);
N. BooRsTYN, CoPYRiGHT LAw § 3:3, at 86 (1981) (Congress intended that, to qualify as work
made for hire, work of independent contractor must satisfy § 101(2) and parties must agree
in signed written agreement that work will be for hire); A. LATMAN, supra note 1, at 114, 121
(in legislative history of § 101, Congress said nothing about degree of control that commis-
sioning party possesses or exercises); I M. Nn&MmR, supra note 5, § 5.03[B], at 5-13 (Congress
intended that only those specially ordered or commissioned works that § 101(2) lists would
qualify as works for hire); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing pre-1976
case law regarding works made for hire).
45. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (courts disagree over whether person
appearing to be independent contractor actually may be employee).
46. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing courts which have determined
that right to control cannot make independent contractor into employee).
47. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing courts which have determined
that hiring party's right to control determines employment status).
48. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1984).
49. Aldon Accessories, Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 548 (2d Cir. 1984). In Aldon
an official representing Aldon Accessories Ltd. (Aldon), although testifying that he was not
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sories Ltd. (Aldon) claimed that the defendant, by selling sculpted figurines
that were identical to Aldon's figurines, had infringed Aldon's copyright in
the figurines.5 0 The Aldon court reasoned that, although an independent
contractor may satisfy one of the nine specific categories of section 101(2), s t
an independent contractor also may surrender his independence to a hiring
party and, therefore, temporarily may become an employee of the hiring
party.12 Additionally, the Aldon court reasoned that, if an independent
contractor temporarily becomes an employee of a hiring party, the hiring
party, under section 101(1) of the 1976 Act, becomes the owner of any
copyright on work that the independent contractor produces. 3 The Second
Circuit determined that, although Congress, by enacting the 1976 Act, did
not intend completely to eliminate the broad pre-1976 work for hire doc-
trine,14 Congress intended to require a hiring party actually to participate
in and control an employee's work to get copyright ownership. 5 Because
the Aldon court, unlike many other courts 5 6 did not conclude that the 1976
Act completely replaces pre-1976 common law, one commentator has called
the Aldon court's theory the "compromise" theory. 7 Unlike the Aldon
court, the Brunswick court found that the advertisers had not exercised the
requisite level of commissioning party participation and control. 5 Like the
an artist, closely supervised the development of clay models for the animal sculptures that
Aldon planned to market, determined the posture and demeanor of the sculpted figures, and
constantly oversaw all work of the sculptors. Id. at 549-50.
50. Id. at 550. In Aldon a Spiegel buyer spoke with an Aldon representative at the
Chicago Gift Show in January 1981. Id. At the Gift Show, the buyer demonstrated interest
in Aldon's new unicorn and Pegasus statuettes that the Japanese and Taiwanese artists had
designed. Id. At the buyer's request, the Aldon representative sent the buyer samples of the
statuettes. Id. After sending the samples, however, the company did not hear from Spiegel
again. Id. About six months later, statues identical to Aldon's statuettes appeared in Spiegel's
catalog. Id. Aldon brought suit for copyright infringement in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York. Id. at 549.
51. Id. at 551.
52. Id. The Aldon court recognized that the appropriate question in determining whether
an independent contractor is an employee is whether the contractor is actually "independent"
or whether the employer controls and supervises the independent contractor's work. Id. at
552-53. The Aldon court determined that, if an employer controls a contractor's work, section
101(1) of the 1976 Act governs their working relationship. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 552 (legislative history of 1976 Act contains no evidence that Congress
wished to alter current definitions of "employee" and "scope of employment").
55. See id. at 551-52 (legislative history of 1976 Act implies that Congress intended to
narrow definition of specially ordered or commissioned works to enumerated categories of §
101(2) without excluding work of independent contractors from coverage of § 101(1)).
56. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (courts disagree over whether 1976 Act
altered common-law work made for hire doctrine).
57. See Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 332 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding
that, in failing to conclude that 1976 Act replaces pre-1976 common law and in concluding
that copyright always will not vest in commissioning party, Aldon court adopted compromise
position).
58. Brunswick Beacon v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir.
1987).
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Aldon court, however, the Brunswick court did recognize that a commis-
sioned party temporarily may become the employee of a commissioning
party.
59
Despite the reasoning of the Aldon and Brunswick courts, the legislative
history of the 1976 Act does not suggest that Congress intended to include
in its definition of work made for hire independently contracted work that
satisfies the requirements of the employment relationship described in section
101(1).60 The influence of the Register of Copyrights (the Register) on the
early revisions of the 1909 Act illustrates the issues that concerned Congress
in drafting section 101 of the 1976 Act.6' In a 1961 report to Congress, the
Register suggested that Congress should not use the phrase "works made
for hire" in the new statute because the term "works made for hire"
presumptively included works that a commissioned party produces.62 The
Register speculated that Congress should narrow the work for hire doctrine
to works that employees create within the regular scope of their employ-
ment.62 After the bill became law, a report in the United States House of
Representatives acknowledged that the final definition of works made for
hire, by explicitly listing those works that will be works made for hire under
certain circumstances,64 reflected a compromise between Congress and the
Register. 65 Congress, therefore, appears to have honored the Copyright
Office's wish that the legislature limit the work of independent contractors
to the enumerated categories of section 101(2) of the 1976 Act.
6
59. Id.
60. See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text (discussing pressures on Congress during
revisions of 1909 Act to limit works made for hire by independent contractors to few specific
categories).
61. See A. LAWMAN, supra note 1, at 119 (discussing Register's argument that Congress
should exclude commissioned works from work made for hire doctrine); REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENEA.L REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 87, 88 (1961) (Congress should limit definition of works made for hire to works that
employee prepares within scope of employment and should not include commissioned works
in definition of works made for hire).
62. REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 87, 88 (1961).
63. Id. The Copyright Office's preliminary draft bill for the revision of the 1909 Act
reflected the suggestions of the Register of Copyrights (Register) by excluding a work made
on special order or commission from the definition of a work made for hire. A. LATMAN,
supra note 1, at 119.
64. A. LATMAN, supra note 1, at 120. Publishers of collective works like encyclopedias
and dictionaries objected to the total exclusion of specially commissioned works from the
preliminary draft bill's definition of a work made for hire. Id. Ultimately, Congress included
in the draft bill for the 1976 Act a provision that allowed specially ordered or commissioned
work to fall under the definition of work made for hire if both parties agreed in writing to
the work for hire status. Id. Later, legislators revised the draft bill to enumerate specific types
of specially ordered or commissioned work. Id. at 121-22.
65. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. AND AiamN. NEWS 5659, 5736-37 (work for hire provisions of § 101 of 1976 Act are
result of carefully balanced compromise).
66. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (discussing development of draft bill
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The language of section 101 supports the conclusion that Congress
intended to distinguish clearly between employment and commissioned or
independently contracted work. 7 The two-tiered division of the statute into,
first, works made for hire that employees prepare within the scope of
employment and, second, works made for hire that a hiring party specially
orders or commissions, suggests that Congress intended to create two
mutually exclusive categories, and to give independent contractors the own-
ership of copyright on works that the independent contractors created.6
t
The Brunswick court's "compromise" theory, which includes an independent
contractor in the section 101(2) category of works that a hiring party
specially orders or commissions and also allows an independent contractor
to become an employee under section 101(1), conflicts with the language of
the 1976 Act.69 The Brunswick test, based on a hiring party's actual control
over an independent contractor, forces courts that determine work made
for hire status to rely heavily on the facts of a particular case rather than
on an established definition of a work made for hire.
70
for 1976 Act). During the development of section 101(2) of the 1976 Act, Congress did not
evidence concern over the amount of supervision and control that a commissioning party
exercised over an independent contractor's work. A. LATxMA1, supra note 1, at 121. Congress,
in establishing that, except for works in one of the nine specified categories, a hiring party
and an independent contractor cannot declare by agreement that the contractor's work will be
a work made for hire, seemed to indicate that the amount of control that a hiring party
exercises over an independent contractor's work is irrelevant under section 101 of the 1976
Act. See id. at 122 (definition of works made for hire in § 101(I) of 1976 Act refers to
salaried or regular employees and excludes independent contractors, regardless of amount of
supervision that employers retain over independent contractors' works).
67. See Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 335 (5th Cir. 1987)
(dichotomous phrasing of § 101 of 1976 Act clearly distinguishes between works of employee
and works that individual specially orders or commissions).
68. See id. at 334-36 (because categories of § 101 are mutually exclusive, right to control
cannot make independent contractor into employee); Joseph J. Legat Architects v. United
States, 625 F. Supp. 293, 298 (N.D. Il1. 1985) (definition of employment relies on employer's
right to control work of employee, but formal independent contractors by definition are not
employees); Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1319 (D. Pa.
1985) (work for hire doctrine applies to independent contractors only in instances that § 101(2)
enumerates), aff'd on other grounds, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
877 (1987); Childers v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 978, 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (if
independent contractor's project does not fall into one of enumerated categories of § 101(2)
of 1976 Act, project is not work made for hire); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller v. Empire
Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 258 (D. Neb. 1982) (proper test of employment relationship
is hiring party's right to control worker's performance, but formal independent contractors
are not employees); Mister B Textiles v. Woodcrest Fabrics, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 21, 24
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 854 (D.N.J. 1981) (same).
69. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 334 (courts cannot extract Aldon rule from language of §
101 of 1976 Act).
70. See id. at 333-34 (discussing buyers', sellers', and courts' difficulties in predicting
status of work made for hire doctrine under "actual control" test). In Easter Seal Society v.
Playboy Enterprises the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that,
because an employer may exercise differing levels of "actual control" over different works
that an independent contractor produces, the outcome of a work made for hire analysis of
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Because a fact-specific interpretation of section 101 of the 1976 Act
might produce inconsistent decisions, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit proposed a less fact-specific interpretation of the work
for hire doctrine in Easter Seal Society v. Playboy Enterprises.71 In Easter
Seal the defendant had used in a pornographic film parts of a tape that a
television station had filmed for an agent of the Easter Seal Society. 72 The
Fifth Circuit determined that the language of the 1976 Act indicates that
employees' work and specially ordered or commissioned work are mutually
exclusive categories. 73 The Easter Seal court reasoned that an independent
contractor may prepare a work made for hire if the independent contractor's
work satisfies one of the nine enumerated categories of section 101(2) and
if the hiring party and the independent contractor agree in writing that
copyright will vest in the hiring party. 74 The Easter Seal court, however,
defined an "employee" under section 101(1) of the 1976 Act according to
the Restatement of Agency definition of employee, which distinguishes
the relationship between a particular hiring party and independent contractor will differ for
each work that the independent contractor produces. Id. at 333. The Easter Seal court suggested
that the unpredictability of the actual control test complicates business arrangements between
employers and independent contractors. Id. The Easter Seal court recognized that, because a
hiring party incorrectly may predict that the hiring party exercises sufficient control over the
independent contractor's work to make the work a work made for hire, the hiring party
unexpectedly may become liable to an independent contractor for copyright infringement if a
court disagrees with the hiring party's prediction. Id.
71. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987).
72. Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 324 (5th Cir. 1987). In Easter
Seal an agent of the Easter Seal Society hired WYES, a New Orleans public television station,
to tape a parade and jam session that the television station would edit into a short program
for the National Easter Seal Telethon. Id. WYES charged the Easter Seal Society rates below
the market rate for its services as a charitable contribution. Id. During the taping, the Easter
Seal Society representative gave unprofessional advice on camera angles and scenes and failed
to give advice on lighting, color balance, sound recording, and other characteristics of the
job. Id. The television station supervised all employees involved in the taping and made all
final decisions about the final position of cameras and other equipment. Id.
After finishing the taping, the television station sent the Easter Seal Society's taped footage
to a Canadian television producer for use in a pornographic film. Id. at 324-25. The film,
"Candy, the Stripper," aired nationally four times. Id. at 325. During an airing, at least one
New Orleans resident recognized himself in the parade scene. Id. After this "sighting," the
New Orleans resident filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana. Id. The district court found in favor of the defendant, determining that the Society
did not "employ" the television station workers under the 1976 Act. Id. The district court,
therefore, concluded that WYES owned the copyright on the film footage. Id. The Society
appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Id.
73. See id. at 335 (recognizing "simple dichotomy" that paragraphs (1) and (2) of §
101 of 1976 Act represent).
74. Id. In addition to adopting a two-tiered interpretation of § 101 of the 1976 Act, the
Easter Seal court suggested that, if an "employer" exercises actual control over an independent
contractor's work, the "employer" in reality will become the co-owner of a joint work as
defined in § 201(a) of the 1976 Act. Id. at 333; see Mister B Textiles Inc. v. Woodcrest
Fabrics, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 21, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (because plaintiff closely supervised design
of new fabric, plaintiff was statutory coauthor of design).
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between "employees" and "independent contractors. '75 The Fifth Circuit
determined that, because the television station was an independent contractor
of the plaintiff and because the relationship between the plaintiff and the
independent contractor did not satisfy section 101(2) of the 1976 Act, the
work made for hire doctrine did not apply to the situation in Easter Seal.
7 6
The Easter Seal court concluded, therefore, that the plaintiff did not own
the copyright on the film footage.?
Because the Easter Seal court's interpretation of section 101 provides a
clear definition of works made for hire that distinguishes between employees
and independent contractors, n the Easter Seal decision comports more
closely to the wording of the 1976 Act than the Brunswick decision does.
79
The Brunswick court's "actual control" test, in application, easily could
become a "right to control" test. 80 Courts may fail to distinguish between
a hiring party that exercises actual control over his independent contractor's
work, and a hiring party that retains but does not exercise the right to
75. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 334-35. According to the Easter Seal court, the Restatement
of Agency (Restatement), although not a source of national law, provides sound general
principles by which to determine whether an employment relationship exists between the hiring
and hired parties. Id. at 335; see RESrATE MNT (SEcoND) oF AGENcY § 220(2) (1957) (listing
factors that distinguish employment relationships from employer-independent contractor rela-
tionships). The Easter Seal court reasoned that, although no "national" agency law exists, the
Restatement has become a general common law in which "scope of employment" takes on a
commonly accepted definition. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 335 n.18; see REsTATEmENT, supra, §
220(2) (listing factors characteristic of "scope of employment").
The Restatement lists ten factors to assist courts in distinguishing employment relationships
from employer-independent contractor relationships. REsTATEmENT, supra, § 220(2). The Re-
statement suggests that, to determine whether an employment relationship exists, a court should
examine the amount of control that a hiring party exercises over a hired party's work. Id.
Second, a court should examine whether the hired party works in a distinct occupation or
business. Id. Third, a court should question whether the hired party usually performs the work
under the direction or supervision of an employer. Id. Fourth, the Restatement recommends
that courts examine the amount of skill that the work requires. Id. Fifth, a court should
determine whether the hiring party supplies tools, instruments, or a place of work for the
hired party. Id. Sixth, a court should examine the length of time of the employment. Id.
Seventh, a court should consider the method of payment that the hiring party uses when
paying the hired party. Id. Eighth, a court should question whether the regular business of
the hiring party includes the hired party's type of work. Id. Ninth, a court should examine
the intentions of the parties. Id. Last, the Restatement suggests that a court should determine
whether the employer is in business. Id.
76. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 337.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 334-35 (defining "employment" according to guidelines of Restatement of
Agency enables courts and future parties to agree on and predict meaning of work made for
hire doctrine in § 101 of 1976 Act).
79. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (discussing mutually exclusive categories
of § 101).
80. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 334. The Easter Seal court argued that, because the 1909
Act's work for hire doctrine gradually became a presumption that the individual who financed
a work controlled its production and owned the copyright on the work, the "actual control"
test in Aldon gradually might become a "right to control" test. Id.
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control his independent contractor's work.8 1 Unlike the Easter Seal court's
more practical interpretation of the work made for hire doctrine, the "actual
control" test that the Fourth Circuit adopted appears to return the work
made for hire doctrine to the pre-1976 presumption that copyright vests in
the commissioning party. 2 For example, in Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid"3 the defendant filed a copyright registration on a sculpture
that the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) had commissioned
the defendant to produce. 4 The Reid court considered whether CCNV or
the defendant owned the copyright on the sculpture.85 The Reid court
determined that, for CCNV to own the copyright, CCNV must have had
an employment relationship with the defendant.8 6 The Reid court also
determined that, for an employment relationship satisfying section 101(1)
to exist, CCNV must have instigated the relationship between CCNV and
the defendant or must have possessed the right to direct and supervise
Reid's work.8 7 The Reid court concluded that a hiring party must possess
only a right to direct and supervise an independent contractor's work.,8 The
Reid court, in citing the "actual control" test as support for the Reid
court's conclusion, disregarded language in Brunswick and Aldon that
requires the hiring party actually to exercise control and discretion over an
independent contractor's work.8 9 The Reid decision illustrates the risk that
81. See Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410, 415
(4th Cir. 1987) (Hall, J., dissenting) (regardless of whether advertiser exercised control over
design of advertisements, advertiser retained right to control and supervise nature and content
of advertisements and, therefore, advertisements were works made for hire); Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1456 (D.D.C. 1987) (regardless of amount
of supervision that "employer" actually exercises, if "employer" retains right to direct and
supervise manner in which worker performs work, "employer" owns copyright on work).
82. See supra notes 80-81 (discussing risk that courts will interpret "actual control" test
as "right to control" test and will necessitate return to common law presumption of ownership
by "employer").
83. 652 F. Supp. 1453 (D.D.C. 1987).
84. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1454 (D.D.C.
1987). In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid the plaintiff (CCNV) commissioned
the defendant to design a Christmas sculpture dedicated to the homeless. Id. Mitch Snyder,
CCNV's representative, and other CCNV members originated the concept for the sculpture,
the poses of the figures, and the title of the sculpture. Id. at 1454-56. The defendant, however,
made some alterations in the CCNV design. Id. at 1455. In Reid, after Reid had completed
the sculpture and CCNV had displayed the sculpture, Reid brought the sculpture back to his
studio for minor repairs. Id. at 1456. Snyder planned to take Reid's work on a tour of several
cities. Id. Reid, however, objected to Snyder's plan to take Reid's work on a tour and stated
that the sculpture's material would not withstand the stress. Id. Snyder refused to spend more
money to improve the durability of the sculpture and demanded that Reid return the sculpture
to CCNV. Id. Reid replied by filing a registration of copyright and announcing a tour of his
own. Id.
85. Id. at 1454.
86. Id. at 1456.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.; see Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir.) (in
determining whether employment relationship exists, court must consider whether employing
party actually controls and supervises contractor), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
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the Brunswick test poses. The Easter Seal interpretation of section 101 of
the 1976 Act poses less risk than the "actual control" test that courts will
apply an interpretation of section 101 resembling the pre-1976 definition of
a work made for hire.90
Although the Easter Seal interpretation is more consistent with the
language of the 1976 Act, the Easter Seal court's test, applied to the facts
in Brunswick, would produce the same conclusion that the Brunswick court
reached. 9' The Easter Seal decision indicates that, if an employment rela-
tionship existed between the Beacon design staff and the advertisers, elements
of an independent contractor relationship would not be present.92 In Brun-
swick elements of an independent contractor relationship were present.93
The presence of these elements in Brunswick suggests that the Beacon design
staff artists were independent contractors that the advertisers engaged to
design advertisementsf 4 Under the Easter Seal analysis, because the adver-
tisers did not employ the Beacon design staff, the copyright on the adver-
tisements should have belonged to the design staff's true employers, the
Beacon, and not to the advertisers. 95 By determining that an independent
contractor may become an employee under section 101 of the 1976 Act, the
Fourth Circuit risks that the criterion for the "actual control" test might
become a right to control criterion.9 6 As a result, courts interpreting the
90. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text (discussing reasoning and holding of
Easter Seal court).
91. See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text (applying Easter Seal reasoning to facts
in Brunswick).
92. See Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 334-35 (courts should define "employment" as Restate-
ment of Agency does, distinguishing between employment and independent contractor rela-
tionships); see also Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410,
412 (4th Cir. 1987) (describing relationship between advertisers and Beacon design staff);
REsTATEmmNT (SEcoND) OF AOG cy § 220 (1957) (distinguishing between "employees" and
"independent contractors").
93. See Brunswick, 810 F.2d at 411-12 (describing relationship between Beacon design
staff and advertisers). In Brunswick the Beacon employed a design staff to develop advertising
layouts for the newspaper. Id. Unlike the Free Press, the Beacon employed a special staff to
develop advertising layouts and supply artistic material to the Beacon. Id. The Beacon's
decision to employ a special staff implies that designing advertising layouts requires a special
skill for which the companies requesting advertisements contracted. See id. (describing duties
of Beacon design staff). The companies in Brunswick that requested advertising layouts from
the Beacon did not design advertisements as a regular business. Id. at 415 (Hall, J., dissenting).
The advertisers were co-owners of a car dealership in special need of a design for an
advertisement. Id. According to the Restatement definition of an employment relationship, the
relationship between the Beacon design staff and the advertisers closely resembled the rela-
tionship between a hiring party and an independent contractor. See supra note 75 and
accompanying text (discussing factors distinguishing employment relationship from employer-
independent contractor relationship).
94. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing aspects of advertiser-design
staff relationship in Brunswick that suggest employer-independent contractor relationship).
95. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (work made for hire is either work that employee prepares
within scope of his employment or work satisfying one of nine categories that individual
specially orders or commissions).
96. See infra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing risk that "actual control" test
will become "right to control" test).
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Brunswick decision may label many independent contractors as employees
although, in numerous aspects, the independent contractors truly are inde-
pendent.
97
In Brunswick, the Fourth Circuit determined that a hiring party may
exercise so much control and supervision over an independent contractor
that the independent contractor temporarily becomes an employee of the
hiring party under section 101 of the 1976 Act. 98 The Fourth Circuit, by
relying on the amount of control that a hiring party has over an independent
contractor in determining whether the independent contractor is an "em-
ployee," leaves copyright attorneys with a difficult standard to apply in
interpreting section 101. 91 Although the Brunswick decision is consistent
with the holdings of some other circuits,00 courts that have interpreted the
1976 Act to distinguish between independent contractors and employees
have provided a clearer interpretation of the work made for hire doctrine
than the Brunswick court because those courts rely on the accepted Restate-
ment of Agency definition of an "employee." 10' In failing to distinguish
between independent contractors and employees, the Brunswick decision
might permit courts to revert to the common-law presumption that a
copyright vests in the independent contractor.'0 2 As a result, the Fourth
Circuit's "compromise" position, which allows courts to label independent
97. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text (discussing Reid as example of risk
that "actual control" test might become right to control test). In applying the Brunswick
interpretation of the work made for hire doctrine, courts may label many independent
contractors as employees, although, in crucial respects, they are independent. For example, a
hiring party may control the work of a contractor although the contractor works in an
occupation distinct from the hiring party's occupation and possesses special skills that the
hiring party temporarily requires, because the hiring party regularly is not in the business of
the contractor. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing elements of independent
contractor relationship that Restatement of Agency describes). A district court applying the
Brunswick test might label the independent contractor as an employee for purposes of section
101, although the contractor is independent of the hiring party in all meaningful respects. See
Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir.) ("actual control" test
defines employment by hiring party's actual control and supervision over work of independent
contractor), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984); supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing
factors that traditionally have defined "independent contractor").
98. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (discussing holding and reasoning of
Brunswick court).
99. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (Easter Seal court concluded that Aldon
"actual control" test limits predictability of law).
100. See Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Sys. Software, 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th Cir.) (term
"employee" does not include only "regular" employees because right to control determines
employment status), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 434 (1986); Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel,
Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir.) (hiring party may so control and supervise independent
contractor that independent contractor becomes employee for purposes of § 101(1) of 1976
Act), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
101. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (Easter Seal court concluded that definition
of employment in Restatement of Agency provides predictable source for interpretation of §
101 of 1976 Act).
102. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text (discussing risk that "actual control"
test might become "right to control" test).
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contractors as employees, appears to disregard Congress' intent in enacting
the 1976 Act to distinguish between employees and independent contractors.
MEaLISSA J. HALsTEAD-WmTE

